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2. Religion and Modemization in Comparative Perspective - David Martin's Theory
of Secularization reconsidered
Willfried Spohn
David Martin's general theory of secularization is the most elaborated historical-
sociologigal theory of the varying processes of secularization in the European Christian
civilization. However, Martin's theory has been rarely taken up in systematic ways-if so, as
a directly testable theory of present degrees of secularization in Europe, rather than in its
theoretical bases and historical comparative scope.
I myself have come across Martin's theory in my historical-sociological research on re¬
ligion, nation-building and class formation in 19th and 20th centuries Germany in an Euro-
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pean-American comparative framework. On this basis, the following reconsideration
should be understood both as a plea and a critical continuation of Martin's historical-
sociological methodology.
I start with a brief reconstraction ofthe basic principles of Martin's theory of secularization
and then continue in tum with a reconsideration of the main causal Clusters affecting the
secularization processes: the role of the religious stractures; the geopolitical frame condi¬
tions; and the socio-economic contexts of secularization.
/. 77ze basic principles
Against the now weakening mainstream of the evolutionistic secularization thesis, Martin
has in mind an historical-empirical theory of secularization. Instead of presupposing secu¬
larization as a universal by-product of modemization, Martin insists on a strictly empirically
generalizing theory. Restricting the scope of his analysis to European Christianity
(including its North and South American off-spring), his theory Claims
- no more and no
less - to provide a general explanation of the manifold forms and processes of seculariza¬
tion within the European civilization.
The starting point of Martin's theory is the contemporary religious map of European and
American societies and regions. At the time ofthe publication of Martin's book, this map in
terms of institutional participation and subscribed beliefs looked like the following. In
Europe, the dominant Protestant societies were most secularized, Britain highly and the
Scandinavian countries very highly; mixed societies like the Netherlands and Germany had
a medium degree of secularization; dominant Catholic societies ranged from low (Italy and
Spain) to high (Hungary) and very high secularization (France); and Orthodox societies like
Romania and Russia were characterized by medium to high secularization. In contrast, in
dominantly Protestant North America and dominantly Catholic South America the degrees
of secularization were very low. At the present, this religious map has only to be revised re-
garding the religious revival in post-Communist Eastern Europe.
In order to explain these variations in secularization, Martin Starts from the cultural-
institational core of each religious type. The basic religious figurations of Protestantism,
Catholicism and Christian Orthodoxy as well as its varying mixtures in each national
framework have been the result both ofthe divide between Western and Eastem Christianty
and the balancing between Reformation and Counter-reformation. As a result, the degrees
of institutional monopolism or pluralism within each country have been formed. They in
tum determine the basic tracks of secularization. Martin's first basic principle assumes that
the stronger the religious monopolism is the strenger are the secularization tendencies or
vice versa, the stronger the religious pluralism is the weaker are the secularization proc¬
esses.
//. The basic pattern
On the basis ofthe cultural-institutional core ofa religious pattern and the related degrees of
pluralism or monopolization, Martin distinguishes eight main religious/secular figurations:
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Within Protestantism 1. the North-American pattern with an outspoken denominational plu¬
ralism and low secularization; 2. the British pattern with a limited pluralism between the
Anglican and the dissenting sectors and correspondingly limited secularization; 3. the
Scandinavian pattern with strongly limited pluralism and streng secularization; within the
confessionally dualistic societies 4. the mixed pattern with dominant Protestantism and
subdominant Catholicism and a medium degree of asymmetrical secularization; within
Catholic societies 5. the French-Latin pattern of Catholic monopoly with a sharp Opposition
between streng secularization and religious Integration; a sub-type is 6. the right-wing reac-
tive organicism; an extension is also 7. the Latin-American pattern with less monopoliza-
tion and secularization; and 8. the Russian pattern of Orthodox monopoly with outspoken
secularization and an inverted left-wing secular monopoly.
In a first approximation, this typology of religious-secular pattems provides a rough ex¬
planation of the ränge between low to high secularization on the European-American re¬
ligious map: from Protestant pluralism to confessional dualism to Catholic monopoly and
Orthodox monopoly. However, certain inconsistencies between the qualitative dimension
of cultural-institational forms and the quantitative continuum from pluralism to monopo¬
lism remain. To solve these inconsistencies one should consider-this is my first critical the-
sis-first the qualitative structure ofa religious figuration and only then its degree of plural¬
ism or monopolization.
First, in the Protestant cases, the wide ränge secularization degrees between the U.S.,
Great Britain, Sweden and Protestant Germany can only be explained by including the sub-
stantial differences between Calvinism and Lutheranism. Second, also in the Protes-
tant/Catholic mixed cases like the Netherlands and Germany the qualitative differences
between Calvinism and Lutheranism matter. And third, in the case of religious monopolies,
an explanation of the differences in secularization between Catholicism and Christian Or-
thodoxy has to include their different institutional and cultural forms.
///. The geo-political environments
The religious structures alone do not suffice to explain in a deductive manner the historical
paths of secularization in each case. As a second dimension, Martin's theory takes into ac¬
count the political-institutional environments which the religious-secular configurations are
embedded in. Basically, Martin's theory distinguishes between two opposite stractural
poles: center and periphery. His second basic principle states that the centrifugal tendencies
of secularization within each religious pattern come to effect in a pure form only under the
conditions of political center-formation, whereas the centripetal forces of religious Integra¬
tion become stronger under peripheral conditions.
With the center/periphery model, Martin is able to approximate more adequately the ba¬
sic pattems to the empirical variations of secularization. Particularly, he can explain the im-
portant exceptions of high religious Integration in peripheral national and ethnic groups in
the few Westem European cases and the many Eastern European ones. This bi-polar center-
periphery model, however, is primarily drawn from the modern Western European nation-
state. It can be applied - this is my second critical thesis - only with reservations to other
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regions where the development ofthe modern nation-state is lacking or has taken modified
routes. To make the center/periphery model more accurate, I propose a more complex
model of scalar center-periphery relations that distinguishes in institutional and cultural
terms imperial, national and ethnic-regional levels of center/periphery formation.
To begin with, only the Western European Atlantic zone did early on experience modern
state-formation and nation-building, establishing a firm institutional framework for relig¬
ious figurations and secularization pattems. In Central Europe, by contrast, an integrated
nation-state was materializing only relatively late; under these conditions, organized relig¬
ion was bound up with transnational-imperial or regional-ethnic structures, modifying the
religious figurations and secularization pattems. In Eastem Europe, even more so, imperial-
bureaucratic structures combined with peripheral forms of nation-building until quite re¬
cently, strengthening the religious integration of ethnic and national groups. Finally, also in
the European settlement societies in America the geopolitical constellations combined dif¬
ferent colonial regimes, indigenous structures and immigration pattems, modifying also the
respective secularization trajectories.
IV. Socio-economic contexts
By combining the religious figurations its political environments, David Martin's theory of
secularization comes very close to the empirical variations of secularization on the Euro¬
pean-American religious map. Still, some discrepancies between the model of seculariza¬
tion and its empirical variations remain. As a third dimension, Martin takes also into con-
sideration, though very briefly, three main stages of socio-economic modemization: the
pre-industrial period, the first and the second phase of industrialization. David Martin's third
principle states that these socio-economic stages are related to degrees of social disintegra-
tion and secularization.
Although, according to Martin, the impact of modemization on secularization is refracted
by the religious and political structures, he is accepting here the classical assumption of a
parallel movement between modemization and secularization. This assumption, however,
has come under increasing criticism by the recent history and sociology of religion reana-
lyzing the Western industrializing societies themselves. On this basis, I formulate my third
critical thesis: Secularization is not a direct stractural outcome of socio-economic modemi¬
zation, but it depends on the interaction between modemization and religion. The core issue
is whether or not religious communities disintegrate, remain stable, or even innovatively
change under the impact of socio-economic modemization.
Precisely the first two industrial nations, England and the United States show the lowest
secularization degrees in terms of religious membership, participation and belief per capita.
The cracial reason for this is independent religious community-building on the micro-level
as a reaction to socio-economic modemization. In contrast, the catching-up industrializers
in Western and Central Europe - the locus classicus of the secularization thesis - did not
possess this micro-mechanism of independent religious community-building, hence indus¬
trialization correlated with secularization. The only modifications were the Catholic sub-
cultures in the mixed pattern. Finally, in the industrial latecomers in Eastem Europe, the
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corrosive effects of socio-economic modemization combined to a large extent with
ideocratic communism, but as an imposed secularism it was only partially able to destroy
traditional religious communities; hence the conspicious contemporary religious revival.
Also in the industrial latecomers in Latin America secularization has been relatively weak,
due to less cohesive Catholic monopoly, the development of social Catholicism and the dy-
namics of Protestant denominationalism. In sum, secularization is not a general conse-
quence of industrialization, its timing and form; rather it depends on the religious activities
and instiution-building in the context of socio-economic modemization.
V. Concluswn
This tour de force through Martin's theory of secularization could do no more than give
some hints to its systematic structure and some suggestions for critical reconsideration. My
hope is that this may serve as a methodological basis for more systematic historical-
sociological comparative research on the complex configurations of religious change and
secularization in the modern world.
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3. Kommentar zu Willfried Spohn
Monika Wohlrab-Sahr
The recent debate on the concept of secularization, as raised by American and Anglo-Saxon
sociologists and social historians - some of whom even claimed a paradigm shift in the
sociology of religion (Warner 1993) - is not at all a new debate. This is shown best by the
work of David Martin (1969) who, in his 1969 book - »The Religious and the Secular« -
